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Intentional choice is an important process underlying human behaviour. Intentional inhi-
bition refers to the capacity to endogenously cancel an about-to-be-executed action at the
last moment. Previous research suggested that such intentional inhibitory control requires
conscious effort and awareness.
Here we show that intentional decisions to inhibit are nevertheless inﬂuenced by uncon-
scious processing. In a novel version of the Go/No-Go task, participants made speeded key-
press actions to a Go target, or withheld responses to a No-Go target, or made free,
spontaneous choices whether to execute or inhibit a keypress when presented with a
free-choice target. Prior to each target, subliminal masked prime arrows were presented.
Primes could be congruent with the Go or No-Go arrows, or neutral. Response times and
proportion of action choices were measured. Primes were presented at latencies that
would give either positive or negative compatibility effects (PCE, Experiment 1, and NCE,
Experiment 2, respectively), based on previous literature.
Go-primes at positive-compatibility latencies facilitated speeded response times as
expected, but did not inﬂuence number of choices to act on free-choice trials. However,
when Go primes were presented at negative-compatibility latencies, ‘‘free’’ decisions to
inhibit were signiﬁcantly increased. Decisions to act or not can be unconsciously manipu-
lated, at least by inhibitory mechanisms. The cognitive mechanisms for intentionally with-
holding an action can be inﬂuenced by unconscious processing. We discuss possible moral
and legal implications of these ﬁndings.
 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.1. Introduction
The idea of voluntary control over what to do, and in-
deed whether to do it at all- is a fundamental but contro-
versial feature of human nature. For example, legal
judgements about criminal behaviour are based on the
view that the agent could have refrained from the criminal
act. Further, the feeling of choosing to act in certain wayswhile resisting others is a common experience in everyday
life. We use the term ‘intentional inhibition’ to refer to the
process of voluntarily withholding the execution of an ac-
tion at the last moment. Inhibition of impending action
triggered by external stimuli has been widely studied,
notably in stop-signal tasks (Logan, Cowan, & Davis,
1984; Verbruggen & Logan, 2008). In such cases, inhibition
can be clearly distinguished from an early decision not to
prepare an action. We use the term inhibition to mean an
intervention mechanism that ‘‘applies the brakes’’ and ac-
tively overrides impending movement (see Aron (2011)
for a review of these mechanisms).
Inhibition in this sense can result either from an external
‘stop’ signal, or from an internal decision. Internally-gener-
ated inhibition has been much less studied, although its
importance in theories of cognitive control is recognised
(Aron, 2011; Filevich, Kühn, & Haggard, 2012). Intentional
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form of voluntary self-control. Libet, Gleason, Wright, and
Pearl (1983) classically argued that the short delay between
awareness of intention and movement onset was sufﬁcient
to allow a ‘conscious veto’ over action. On this view, people
may not have free will, but they may have ‘free won’t’. Re-
cent work in social psychology continues to emphasise the
importance of conscious effort in refraining from appar-
ently rewarding actions (Baumeister, Masicampo, & Vohs,
2011). In both instances, intentional inhibition seems like
a paradigm case for a conscious form of ‘‘agent causation’’
(Kane, 1996a, 1996b). Importantly, however, it is quite
possible that a capacity for internally-generated inhibition
exists, yet its triggering could be unconscious.
Here we ask whether intentional inhibition can be
inﬂuenced by external stimuli that are not consciously per-
ceived. It is widely accepted that endogenous ‘free’ actions
may nevertheless be inﬂuenced by external stimuli, includ-
ing subliminal stimuli that are not consciously perceived,
but whose informational content is processed in the ner-
vous system. For example, subliminal perceptual priming
can manipulate the subjective experience of the agency
of a ‘‘free’’ action (Aarts, Custers, & Wegner, 2005; Linser
& Goschke, 2007; Sato, 2009; Sebanz & Lackner, 2007;
Wenke, Fleming, & Haggard, 2010). Moreover, subliminal
priming can also inﬂuence a ‘‘free’’ decision regarding
which of a number of alternative actions one selects.
However, some psychologists have argued that inhibi-
tion has a special relation to conscious awareness. Speciﬁ-
cally, inhibition of action may be a necessarily conscious
and effortful cognitive control process, and thus immune
to unconscious information-processing (e.g., Dehaene
et al., 2003). We cannot resist a prepotent action without
consciously intending to resist it, and knowing that we
are doing so. This view receives some support from anec-
dotal accounts of intense subjective experience of trying
to overcome urges to prepotent action (St. Augustine,
2006). Overall this would suggest that intentional inhibi-
tion should not be manipulable by subliminal exogenous
stimuli. Even if we do not really have ‘free will’, ‘free won’t’,
in the sense of top-down inhibitory self-control, might re-
main a distinct cognitive process, relatively free from such
unconscious environmental determinants.
Subliminal stimuli can indeed inﬂuence inhibitory pro-
cessing in externally-instructed forced-choice tasks. In
many such studies, primes and targets are directional ar-
rows indicating whether to make a left or right keypress.
Targets preceded by congruent primes show decreased re-
sponse times, and targets preceded by incongruent primes
show increased response times, both relative to neutral
primes (Neumann & Klotz, 1994). This positive compatibil-
ity effect (PCE) is thought to reﬂect facilitation of the
primed response and/or inhibition of the alternative re-
sponse. In contrast, in the negative compatibility effect
(NCE; Eimer, 1999; Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998) the con-
gruent prime paradoxically inhibits responding. By
increasing the stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between
the onset of prime and target, the normal facilitatory effect
of the congruent prime is reversed. Now a prime congruent
with the target slows responses whilst the incongruent
prime speeds responses.One prominent theory for the process driving the PCE
and NCE effects hypothesises that subliminal primes exert
their inﬂuence by motor preparation and then inhibition
of relevant responses. Initially, a prime will exert a facilita-
tory inﬂuence upon the appropriate motor response, acti-
vating it to a sub-response-threshold level. If a congruent
supraliminal target appears, the facilitatory activity caused
by the prime coincides and combines with that of the tar-
get, resulting in a faster response. However, the sub-thresh-
old activation caused by the prime is assumed to be
transient. If no further congruent evidence arrives shortly
after the prime, the prime-induced activation is followed
by a process of auto-inhibition, suppressing the activity be-
low baseline. This process is thought to protect perceptual
systems from oversensitivity to noise (Blankenburg et al.,
2003). Long prime-target SOAs mean that the target ap-
pears during the auto-inhibitory period, thus resulting in
the slowed responses that characterise the NCE. The NCE
has also been explained in other ways. In particular, the
interaction between the prime and the subsequent mask
has been argued to facilitate perception of the alternative
target that is not primed, thus producing a negative com-
patibility effect (Lleras & Enns, 2004; Verleger, Jas´kowski,
Aydemir, van der Lubbe, & Groen, 2004). This question,
which remains controversial, is revisited in the discussion.
Most previous subliminal priming studies focussed on
decisions about what action to make, in two-alternative
forced choice paradigms (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004).
However, recent research has extended the method to
decisions whether to act at all, by studying priming of inhi-
bition in unimanual Go/No-Go tasks Hughes and col-
leagues used masked subliminal primes to inﬂuence
responses in a Go/No-Go paradigm (Hughes, Velmans, &
De Fockert, 2009). Participants were instructed to prepare
a speeded response with a designated hand. They should
respond rapidly following a Go stimulus, but inhibit execu-
tion of this action following a No-Go signal. Left and right
arrow targets were preceded by left, right and neutral
(double arrow) masked primes, at latencies appropriate
for PCE. One arrow direction was designated as the Go
and the other as the No-Go target. They found that Go tar-
gets preceded by a Go prime indeed elicited faster re-
sponses than Go targets preceded by a neutral prime,
while a No-Go prime slowed responses to a Go target,
again compared to neutral. Event-related potentials to
No-Go targets revealed that fronto-central N2 and P3 com-
ponents, previously associated with response inhibition
(Falkenstein, Hoormann, & Hohnsbein, 1999), were modu-
lated by the subliminal primes: No-Go primes reduced the
magnitude of the negative N2 component (300 ms after
the target) elicited by No-Go targets, compared to effects
of neutral and Go primes. This suggests that unconscious
No-Go primes contributed to action inhibition. Thus,
Hughes et al. (2009) argue that unconscious exogenous
cues can indeed inﬂuence inhibitory control processes.
In another Go/No-Go experiment (van Gaal, Ridderink-
hof, Fahrenfort, Scholte, & Lamme, 2008), a Go signal (black
ring) indicated that an action should be performed, unless it
was preceded by the No-Go signal (grey circle). If the stim-
ulus onset asynchrony (SOA) between No-Go and Go sig-
nals was sufﬁcient, the No-Go signal was consciously
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reducing the SOA such that the Go signal masked its pres-
ence. These unconscious No-Go signals reduced the num-
ber of GO responses, and also slowed response times on
those trials where a response did occur. In an fMRI experi-
ment, the same unconscious No-Go signals elicited activity
in frontal inhibitory areas, especially the IFC and pre-SMA
(van Gaal, Ridderinkhof, Scholte, & Lamme, 2010). Finally,
unconsciously presented Stop signals presented prior to a
Go signal in the classic stop signal task (Logan, Cowan &
Davids, 1984), reduced the number of executed responses,
or slowed RTs on trials where responses did occur (van
Gaal, Ridderinkhof, van den Wildenberg, & Lamme, 2009).
These results suggest that inhibition elicited by an
external signal can be unconsciously modulated by sub-
liminal primes, just like action selection decisions between
alternative responses. However, inhibiting one response is
not the same choosing another (Aron, 2011; Simmonds,
Pekar, & Mostofsky, 2008). Accordingly, inhibitory priming
and action-selection priming appear to work in different
ways. First, inhibitory priming recruits a speciﬁc set of
frontal brain areas associated with stopping prepotent ac-
tions, distinct from the areas that accumulate evidence
about alternatives (Van Gaal et al., 2010). Second, inhibi-
tory priming has effects even when the decision to inhibit
comes after an initial decision to act – as in the stop-signal
task. This late inhibition of action implies a late braking or
cancellation process. In contrast, priming of action selec-
tion is considered to bias early accumulation of evidence
in favour of one response.
It remains unclear whether intentional decisions to inhi-
bit action can be unconsciously inﬂuenced in the sameway.
Indeed, no previous study has shown that free, internally-
generated choices whether to execute or inhibit action
can be unconsciously primed. The traditional association
between inhibition and conscious, effortful control
(Dehaene et al., 2003; Mayr, 2004; Vohs & Baumeister,
2013) might suggest that they cannot be. In the present
study we directly tested this claim by investigating whether
unconscious primes can, in fact, inﬂuence intentional
inhibition in a situation where participants have the free
choice to either execute a simple action, or to decide at
the last possible moment to refrain from executing it.
We used amodiﬁedGo/No-Go task inwhich participants
were asked to prepare a single action (a keypress) and await
the presentation of one of three target stimuli: One target
indicated the participant must perform the action (forced
Go), one indicated the inhibition of the action (forced No-
Go), and the third target indicated participants had the free
choice to either act or inhibit (free Go or No-Go). Targets
were preceded bymasked subliminal primes thatwere con-
gruent with the Go or No-Go targets, or were neutral.
Three experiments were run, using prime-target SOA
valueswhichwere known to produce PCE and/or NCE prim-
ing effects. Thus we aimed to measure whether subliminal
Go or No-Go primesmodulate the execution or inhibition of
responses that the participant freely chooses whether to
make or not. Experiments 1 and 2 used left and right point-
ing targets and primes, Experiment 1 with PCE and Experi-
ment 2 with NCE timings. Experiment 3 combined both
types of priming and used upward and downward pointingarrows. Clear predictions could be made regarding the out-
come of these results: Go primes at PCE latencywould facil-
itate and thus speed up forced Go responses, whereas NoGo
primes would inhibit, thus slow down, forced Go responses
relative to Neutral primes. The opposite RT patternwas pre-
dicted for priming at NCE latencies (as per Eimer (1999)).
We predicted that free-choice RTs should be inﬂuenced
by primes in the same way was forced choices. If priming
indeed alters levels of excitation/inhibition in brain motor
circuits, it should also affect the outcome of ‘free’ choices.
Go primes at PCE latency should increase the probability
of choosing to act, and NoGo primes should increase the
probability of choosing to inhibit. Primes at NCE latency
should have the opposite effect. These predictions were
used to guide analysis of the data.2. Method
2.1. Design
Three experiments were designed to measure the
effects of subliminal priming on volitional action and
inhibition in a Go/No-Go paradigm. Stimulus timing was
designed to elicit PCE (Experiment 1), NCE priming (Exper-
iment 2), or both within the same experiment (Experiment
3). The designs were otherwise largely similar.
The basic paradigm involved participants making Go,
No-Go or Free Choice responses to visual target stimuli
using one hand only to make keypress responses. A trial
consisted of a central ﬁxation cross, followed by a visual
subliminal priming sequence (see later) culminating in a
supraliminal target stimulus. In Experiments 1 and 2, Tar-
get stimuli were either left, right, or double-headed (left
and right) arrows. In Experiment 3, target stimuli were
either up arrows, down arrows, or double-headed arrows.
In all experiments, there were 25% Go targets, 25% NoGo
targets and 50% Free Choice targets. Each target could be
preceded by Go, NoGo or Neutral primes, with equal
probability.
In all experiments, participants were instructed that
each trial would start with a ﬁxation cross, and would be
followed by some ‘‘random ﬂashing shapes’’. Participants
were instructed to prepare a keypress action, on every trial,
beginning their preparation from the onset of ﬁxation.
Each trial would culminate in a clearly visible arrow stim-
ulus, that could point either left or right (Experiments 1
and 2), up or down (Experiment 3), or in both directions
(all experiments). They were instructed that one of the
uni-directional arrows was a Go signal, upon which they
must make the prepared action as rapidly as possible.
Speed of response times was stressed, again emphasising
the need for action preparation from the beginning of
every trial. This was further stressed as there was a one
second response window from the onset of any target
stimulus within which to make a response. The opposite
uni-directional arrow was designated as the No-Go target,
upon which participants were instructed to withhold the
keypress action and wait until the next trial.
Double-headed arrows indicated a Free Choice trial.
Participants were instructed to make an in-the-moment
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keypress action on such trials. They were informed that it
made no difference to the experimental outcome if they
chose to act or not: the decision on each trial was arbitrary.
They were encouraged to decide at the last moment, avoid-
ing strategies like alternation of action and inhibition deci-
sions. They were also asked to ensure that they sampled
from both action and inhibition options throughout the
experiment. This was not an explicit instruction to ‘‘equal-
ise’’ act and inhibition choices, but just encouragement to
not bias extremely to one choice or the other. The format
of this instruction relates to a fundamental feature of
experiments on volition. There is an inherent tension be-
tween allowing participants a truly free choice, and the
experimental requirement to have adequate data relating
to both possible responses. Exclusion criteria were deﬁned
to remove participants with outlying distribution of free
choices, thus ensuring a sufﬁcient number of each possible
response for reliable estimation. Participants with a pro-
portion of free-choice actions ±2.5 SD from sample mean
were excluded (see Section 2.2 for details).
There were important difference between experiments
as to which uni-directional arrows were Go and No-Go tar-
gets, and which response hand to use. In Experiments 1
and 2, at the beginning of each of four experimental blocks,
participants were informed which uni-directional arrow –
left or right – was the Go target for the entirety of that
block. Participants were instructed to use the hand congru-
ent with the Go target to respond throughout the block.
Handedness was counterbalanced across participants and
blocks in an ABBA fashion. That is, Go targets and primes
were arrows that were spatially compatible with the hand
used as the Go response. NoGo primes and targets might,
in principle, produce spatial incompatibility effects (Simon,
1969). To control for this possibility, Experiment 3 used up
or down arrows at Go/NoGo targets, and right hand re-
sponses. In all three experiments, only right-handed par-
ticipants were tested.
The experiments used different forms of action-prim-
ing, produced by altering the stimulus-onset-asynchrony
(SOA) between prime and target stimuli (or between mask
and target see Fig. 1). Short SOAs of 52 ms were used to
produce PCE priming (Experiment 1), whereas longer SOAs
of 172ms were used for NCE priming (Experiment 2; Lingnau
& Vorberg, 2005; see Section 2.4 for further details).
Experiment 3 used both PCE and NCE priming in separate
blocks of a within-subject design. Blocking of PCE and
NCE was preferred to randomisation, because trial-by-trial
changes in prime-target SOAs reportedly increase task
difﬁculty (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005).
The frequency of action and inhibition, and the latency
of all responses made were measured in Go, No-Go and
Free Choice trials. Unbeknownst to the participants, each
target stimulus was preceded by a backwards meta-con-
trast masked prime arrow, which could point either left,
right, or be a superimposition of left and right arrows
(up/down arrows in Experiment 3; see Fig. 1; stimulus de-
sign as used by (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). Thus primes
could be either Go, No-Go or Neutral primes based upon
their stimulus congruency. Therefore, Experiments 1 and
2 investigated the effects of prime-response congruencyon target response, whilst Experiment 3 employed a 2
(latency effect: NCE vs PCE)  3 (prime) design.
2.2. Participants
All participants were recruited from the UCL participant
pool. All were self-reported right-handers, had normal or
corrected-to-normal vision and were paid £7.50 for the
hour-long total duration of the experiment. Twenty-two
participants (9 female) took part in Experiment 1, mean
age 26.3 (SD 5.29). Twenty-three participants took part in
Experiment 2, but one was excluded based on prior crite-
ria, because of an excessive tendency to prefer action in
free-choice trials (91.1%, >2.5 standard deviations from
sample mean), which rendered their data on inhibition
choices insufﬁcient and potentially unreliable. This left a
sample of 22 (12 female, mean age 26.9, SD 8.76).
Twenty-three participants took part in Experiment 3.
Again, one was rejected for making so few freely-chosen
actions in Choice trials (1.3%, <2.5 standard deviations
from sample mean) that their data could not be meaning-
fully analysed, leaving a sample of 22 (14 female, mean age
22.4, SD 3.46).
2.3. Procedure
All experiments used an identical procedure in terms of
participant brieﬁng and experimental structure. Experi-
ments 1 and 2 consisted of 384 trials, split over four blocks,
each block varying the response hand and Go-Arrow direc-
tion, as described in Section 2.1. Experiment 3 consisted of
768 trials over 8 blocks, each block consisting exclusively
of PCE or NCE trials, with alternating blocks. For both the
forced Go and No-Go target conditions, 32 trials were pre-
sented for each of the three primes (and for each of the
PCE/NCE Latencies in Experiment 3). For the free Choice
trials, 64 trials were presented for each of the three primes.
Thus, if subjects chose to act or withhold action on similar
numbers of trials, the dataset would sample across free and
forced action and inhibition in a balanced way.
Between each block, participants were allowed a short
self-terminated break. Prior to the main experiment, par-
ticipants undertook a practice session consisting of two
blocks, one for each hand (in Experiment 3, two blocks,
one for each of the PCE and NCE conditions). Practice trials
only used the neutral prime, and involved 6 trials each of
the Free Choice and Forced conditions, thus each practice
block contained 18 trials.
After the main experimental session was complete,
participants were informed of the presence of the sublim-
inal primes, and were then asked to take part in a short
ﬁnal session to collect data on the discriminability of the
primes. One block of trials presented participants with
stimulus sequences similar to those in the main experi-
ments, except that only free choice targets were pre-
sented. Participants were instructed to ignore the
targets. Instead they were asked to concentrate carefully
in the period where the prime appeared – often detectable
as a ‘‘small white ﬂash’’ – and try and decide whether the
prime was a left, right, or neutral prime, and make un-
speeded but forced choices. They were instructed to guess
Fig. 1. Stimulus schema showing the prime–mask–target timings used to produce PCE and NCE priming effects. Experiment 1 used the PCE stimuli shown
in the top panel. Experiment 2 used the NCE stimuli shown in the bottom panel. Experiment 3 used both PCE and NCE timings. Experiment 3 also used up/
down arrows produced by rotating all stimuli by 90.
J. Parkinson, P. Haggard / Cognition 130 (2014) 255–265 259if uncertain. Thus 10 repetitions of each of the three prime
stimuli were presented. The entire experiment lasted
around 1 h.
2.4. Stimuli
Stimuli were presented on a PC using the Psychophys-
ics Toolbox version 3 for Matlab (Brainard, 1997; Kleiner
et al., 2007; Pelli, 1997), on a CRT monitor with a 75 Hz
refresh rate, using a white-on-black colour scheme. Par-
ticipants were seated at a comfortable viewing distance
and used a customised button box to make responses.Stimulus dimensions are shown in Supplementary Fig. 1,
and were based on those used by Lingnau and Vorberg
(2005). At the start of each trial the central ﬁxation cross,
subtending 0.2, was shown for a period of 534 ms
(Experiment 1) or 414 ms (NCE experiment), maintaining
an overall trial duration of 1586 ms (including response
window; 706 ms from onset of ﬁxation to offset of target)
across both experiments, and building on timings estab-
lished previously (Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005). Each prime
stimulus was presented for 13 ms (1 frame at 75 Hz re-
fresh rate), followed by a reintroduction of the ﬁxation
cross for 39 ms.
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120 ms, a stimulus sequence found to make the discrimi-
nation of the prime stimulus not possible (Lingnau &
Vorberg, 2005). Prime-Target SOA interval is the critical
factor in determining the direction of priming: Experiment
1 used PCE priming with a prime-target SOA of 52 ms
(Lingnau & Vorberg, 2005), which meant that the target ar-
row onset at the same time as the mask and thus
surrounded the mask (see Fig. 1, top), also lasting for
120 ms. Experiment 2 used NCE priming with a prime-
target SOA of 172 ms, which meant the target arrow onset
immediately after the offset of the mask, and remained
onscreen for a further 120 ms.Fig. 2. Sample mean of median response times in Experiment 1 (forced
Go and Free Choice actions only). Error bars show standard error of mean.
⁄⁄⁄p < .001; ⁄⁄p < .01; ⁄p < .05; +trend, p < .1.
Fig. 3. Sample mean of median response times in Experiment 2 (forced
Go and Free Choice actions only). Error bars show standard error of mean.
⁄⁄⁄p < .001; ⁄⁄p < .01; ⁄p < .05; +trend, p < .1.3. Results
3.1. Prime discrimination results
Discrimination test resultsweremeasuredby computing
the mean percentage of trials correctly discriminated, and
comparing this against the chance-level of 33% correct using
single sample t-tests. Participants in Experiment 1 (using
PCE timings) could not consciously discriminate primes,
mean correct 35.2%, SD 9.83. A t-test was used to compare
this to the chance level of 33.3%: t(21) = 0.847, p = .406.
Nor could they do so in Experiment 2 (NCE timings), M
31.5%, SD 13.2; t(21) = 0.633, p = .534. In Experiment 3,
mean correct discriminability score was 33.9%, SD 6.73,
and again not signiﬁcantly different from chance,
t(21) = 0.412, p = .684. We also computed d0 measures of
discrimination for each prime in each experiment, and used
repeateduncorrected t-tests to compare these to a value of 0
(nodiscriminationpossible). Themaximumd0 was 0.21, and
no t-test was signiﬁcant, further suggesting that no con-
scious discrimination of the primeswas possible (full values
of d0 and t-test results are shown in Supplementary Table 1).
3.2. Response times
Correct response times were classiﬁed as either ‘‘forced
Go trials’’ (responses to Go signals), or-free choice Go trials
(when participants chose to press the button in free choice
trials). Response times were further classiﬁed according to
the prime (Go/No-Go/Neutral) preceding the target stimu-
lus, thus producing a 2  3 repeated measures ANOVA de-
sign (2  2  3 for Experiment 3, where PCE/NCE Latency
was also varied). Median response time in ms was taken
for each participant for each condition.
3.2.1. Experiment 1 (PCE)
Fig. 2 shows the summary of response times for Exper-
iment 1. There were signiﬁcant main effects of trial type,
F(1,21) = 9.45, p < .006, and of prime type, F(2,42) = 18.0,
p < .001, but no signiﬁcant interaction, F(2,42) = 1.39,
p = .261. Planned contrasts were performed for each trial
type, because we had a speciﬁc prior interest in whether
primes would signiﬁcantly inﬂuence free choice responses.
In forced Go trials, response times were faster for Go prime
trials compared to Neutral primes, t(21) = 3.15, p = .002,
and slower for No-Go primes compared to Neutral primes,t(21) = 3.08, p = .003. In free choice Go trials, response
times were slower for No-Go primes compared to Neutral
primes, t(21) = 5.75 p < .001, but there was no difference
in response times between Go and Neutral prime trials,
t(21) = 0.47, p = .322. On average, over all prime types, free
choice Go responses were 37 ms slower than forced Go
responses. (Full F, t, and response time differences are in
Supplementary Tables 2 and 3).3.2.2. Experiment 2 (NCE)
Fig. 3 shows the summary of response times for Exper-
iment 2. There were signiﬁcant main effects of trial type,
F(1,21) = 44.6, p < .001, and of prime type, F(2,42) = 31.1,
p < .001, but no interaction, F(2,42) = 0.772, p = .466.
Planned contrasts were performed because of our prior
interest in the effects of priming in free choice trials. In
forced Go trials, response times were slower for Go prime
trials compared to Neutral primes, t(21) = 5.21, p < .001,
and slower for No-Go primes compared to Neutral primes,
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times were slower for Go primes compared to Neutral
primes, t(21) = 3.82, p = .001, and there was a trend for
No-Go primes to speed responses compared to Neutral
primes, t(21) = 1.56, p = .067. On average, over all prime
types, free choice Go responses were 42 ms slower than
forced Go responses. (Full F, t, and response time differ-
ences are in Supplementary Tables 4 and 5).3.2.3. Experiment 3
First, response times (excluding No-Go trials) in Exper-
iment 3 were analysed in a 2 (Latency Effect, PCE/NCE)  2
(Trial Type)  3 (Prime type) repeated measures ANOVA
(see Supplementary Table 2 for full results). There were
signiﬁcant main effects of Latency Effect, F(1,21) = 7.24,
p = .014, and Prime, F(2,42) = 4.48, p = .029, but no main ef-
fect of Trial Type F(1,21) = 1.62, p = .217. The only signiﬁ-
cant interaction was between Prime and Latency Effect,
F(2,42) = 21.6, p < .001, supporting the fact that the PCE
and NCE paradigms reverse the response time effects of
priming magnitude (as seen comparing Experiments 1
and 2). There was no three way interaction with trial type,
F(2,42) = 1.87, p = .177.
As for Experiments 1 and 2, we performed planned con-
trasts because of our prior interest in priming effects on
Free Choice trials. We therefore split trials by choice Type
(Forced Go and Free Choice Go) and compared results
across Latency Effect (PCE vs NCE). Fig. 4 shows response
times for Forced Go trials. There was a main effect of Prime,
F(2,42) = 3.44, p = .041, but none of Latency Effect,
F(1,21) = 1.64, p = .241. There was a signiﬁcant interaction
between the two factors, F(2,42) = 27.8, p < .001, due to the
expected opposite effects of PCE and NCE. Using simple ef-
fects testing to investigate this interaction, Go primes at
PCE latency produced faster responses compared than
Neutral primes, t(21) = 2.74, p = .006, and No-Go primes
produced slower response times, t(21) = 3.75, p .001. At
NCE latency Go primes produced slower responses than
Neutral primes, t(21) = 5.77, p < .001, but there was no sig-
niﬁcant difference between No-Go and Neutral primes,PCE NCE300
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Fig. 4. Sample mean of median response times in Experiment 3 (forced
Go trials only). Error bars show standard error of mean. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001;
⁄⁄p < .01; ⁄p < .05; +trend, p < .1.t(21) = 0.52, p = .305. (Supplementary Tables 6 and 7 show
full F, t and response time difference values).
Fig. 5 shows response times for Free Choice trials in
which actions were made. These data were analysed using
the same planned contrasts as forced-choice latencies. There
was a main effect of Latency Effect, F(1,21) = 10.7, p = .004,
nomain effect of Prime, F(2,42) = 2.31, p = .134, and a strong
interaction between the two, F(2,42) = 8.90, p = .002. Simple
effects showed that Go primes at PCE latency did not pro-
duce faster response compared to Neutral prime,
t(21) = 0.277, p = .392, but No-Go primes did slow responses,
t(21) = 6.55, p < .001. Go primes at NCE latency did not sig-
niﬁcantly slow response times, t(21) = 0.848, p = .203, nor
did No-Go primes facilitate them t(21) = 1.10, p = .143.
3.3. Forced response behavioural errors
In forced choice trials, errors were few. In Experiment 1,
in forced Go trials, mean error-of-omission rate was 4.17%
(SD 7.3), whilst in No-Go trials mean error-of-commission
rate was 5.2% (SD 4.74). In Experiment 2, in forced Go tri-
als, mean error-of-omission rate was 0.99% (SD 1.07),
whilst in No-Go trials mean error-of-commission rate
was 2.4% (SD 2.45). In Experiment 3, in the PCE condition,
Go trials produced 4.1% (SD 7.8) and No-Go trials 7.2% (SD
7.3) errors. In the NCE conditions, Go trials produced 3.8%
(SD 7.6) and No-Go 6.6% (SD 7.7) errors. Errors were not
further analysed.
3.4. Free choice behaviour
3.4.1. Experiments 1 & 2
The response rates for Free Choice trials were analysed
to investigate how subliminal priming inﬂuenced partici-
pants’ choices to execute or inhibit actions. In The propor-
tion of actions in Free Choice trials was 58.8% (SD 18.3),
56.5% (SD 14.1), and 50.3% (SD 3.46) for Experiments 1, 2
and 3 respectively. Experiments 1 and 2.
Fig. 6 shows the rate at which participants chose to act
in free choice trials as a function of the precedingPCE NCE300
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Choice Go trials only). Error bars show standard error of mean. ⁄⁄⁄p < .001;
⁄⁄p < .01; ⁄p < .05; +non-signiﬁcant trend, p < .1.
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Fig. 6. Experiment 1 and 2: Mean percentage of Free Choice trials in
which participants chose to act rather than inhibit responses, as
modulated by prime condition. Error bars show standard error of mean.
⁄⁄⁄p < .001; ⁄⁄p < .01; ⁄p < .05; +trend, p < .1.
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3  2 mixed ANOVA using Latency effect (PCE/NCE) and
Prime type showed no signiﬁcant main effect of Latency
F(1,42) = 0.719, p = .401, or Prime type was found,
F(2,84) = 0.372, p = .690, but a highly signiﬁcant interac-
tion between the two factors F(2,84) = 7.08, p = .001.
Simple effects within each experiment was used to ex-
plore this interaction. In Experiment 1 (PCE priming), there
was no signiﬁcant main effect of priming on behavioural
choice, F(1.55,32.6) = 1.7, p = .198, Greenhouse–Geisser
corrected for sphericity. However, in Experiment 2 (NCE
priming) prime type signiﬁcantly inﬂuenced behavioural
choice, F(1.53,32.1) = 6.93, p = .006, Greenhouse–Geisser
corrected for sphericity. Follow-up testing showed that
Go primes produced a signiﬁcant 4% reduction in the pro-
portion of free-choice actions relative to Neutral,
t(21) = 1.87, p = .038. Conversely, a No-Go prime increased
response rate by 3.8%, t(21) = 2.56, p = .009. Note that these
differences are in the predicted direction for inhibitory ef-
fects of NCE priming. Overall, this pattern of results sug-
gests that the volitional free choice to act or inhibit can
be non-consciously inﬂuenced by NCE priming, but the ef-
fect of PCE priming is less clear (full F, t and response dif-
ference values in Supplementary Tables 9 and 10).
3.4.2. Experiment 3
Response rates to Free Choice trials in Experiment 3 are
shown in Fig. 7 and were analysed using a 3  2 repeated
measures ANOVA using Latency Effect and Prime as fac-
tors. There were no main effects of Latency Effect,
P(1,21) = 0.423, p = .518, or Prime, F(2,42) = 1.88, p = .166,
but a signiﬁcant interaction between the two,
F(2,42) = 3.85, p = .029. Simple effects testing to explore
this interaction showed that prime type had no signiﬁcant
effect at PCE latencies, F(2,42) = 0.59, p = .559, but had a
signiﬁcant effect at NCE latencies F(2,42) = 6.25, p = .004.
Follow-up testing of the NCE data showed that Go primes
produced a trend to fewer actions than neutral primes
t(21) = 1.58, p = .065, while No-Go primes signiﬁcantlyincreased the proportion of actions t(21) = 2.39, p = .013.
Comparing the proportions for Go and No-Go primes di-
rectly showed that priming caused a signiﬁcant 6.7% swing
in ‘free’ choices t(21) = 2.99, p = 003.
3.5. Supplementary analyses
We performed two supplementary analyses to investi-
gate speciﬁc concerns with our experimental design.
Experiments 1 and 2 used left/right arrows. Effects of
primes on motor inhibition are thus potentially con-
founded with spatial compatibility effects (Simon, 1969).
Experiment 3 used up/down arrows, and so should avoid
this confound. We therefore compared the effects of prim-
ing between Experiment 1 and the PCE data from Experi-
ment 3, and between Experiment 2 and the NCE data
from Experiment 3, using separate mixed model ANOVAs
on the proportion of free-choice actions. If priming of mo-
tor inhibition strongly depends on spatial compatibility ef-
fects, these ANOVAs should reveal signiﬁcant main effects
of prime orientation. For PCE priming results, there was no
signiﬁcant main effects of either Prime or orientation, nor
was there a signiﬁcant interaction (all p > .074). For NCE
priming results, there was a strong main effect of Prime
type, F(2,84) = 13.1, p < .001, but no signiﬁcant main effect
of orientation and no interaction(both p > .349). This sug-
gests that NCE priming effects are not merely spatial com-
patibility effects (e.g., Simon, 1969).
In a further analysis, we investigated whether the ef-
fects of primes on free-choice responses could involve a
form of speed-accuracy trade-off. In particular, since, our
design encouraged advance preparation of action. There-
fore, a focus on speed might be expected to produce both
rapid response times and few choices to inhibit, while a
more conservative information-processing strategy might
produce both slower response times and more choices to
inhibit. In that case, the effect of each prime type on a par-
ticipant’s response times should be strongly related to the
effect of the same prime on the proportion of free-choice
J. Parkinson, P. Haggard / Cognition 130 (2014) 255–265 263actions. To investigate this possibility, we correlated the
effects of Go primes on each participant’s free choice re-
sponse times and action choices. A similar correlation
was performed for NoGo primes. Neither correlation was
signiﬁcant (all p > .1).
Full F, t and difference values can be found in Supple-
mentary Tables 11 and 12).4. Discussion
These experiments provide the ﬁrst evidence, to our
knowledge, that unconscious priming can inﬂuence the
‘free’ decision to act or inhibit. We used a modiﬁed Go/
No-Go paradigm in which Go, No-Go or Free Choice targets
were preceded by masked primes. The primes were con-
gruent with Go targets, No-Go targets, or were neutral.
By varying the SOA between primes and targets, we were
able to use the same prime stimulus to either facilitate or
inhibit the response to the target. Subliminal primes were
shown to inﬂuence both response times and action choices,
in both forced and free choice conditions.
In particular, our subliminal primes were able to inﬂu-
ence the intentional decision to withhold action on free-
choice trials. A Go prime at NCE latency increased the pro-
portion of choices to inhibit on free-choice trials, while No-
Go primes increased the proportion of choices to act. This
effect was consistent with previous NCE effects on forced
choice reaction time, and with our own data. Brieﬂy, the
target-congruent prime acts to slow responses to the tar-
get, by a process of auto-inhibition of the target-related re-
sponse (Eimer, 1999; Schlaghecken, Rowley, Sembi,
Simmons, & Whitcomb, 2007), whilst target-incongruent
primes speed this response. NCE effects are often explained
in terms of auto-inhibitory processes induced by primes
(Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). We show that these pro-
cesses may also inﬂuence the ‘free’ decision to act or not.
Intentional decisions to withhold action might arise for
the same reason as auto-inhibition in NCE priming. That
is, if internal action decisions are not subsequently con-
ﬁrmed and reinforced, the corresponding motor activation
may then be suppressed. This process of auto-inhibition
may partly explain why volitional decisions often appear
weak and changeable (Fleming, Mars, Gladwin, & Haggard,
2009). Some authors argue that the NCE is due not to mo-
tor inhibition, but to interactions between prime and mask,
leading to a perceptual after-effect. This effectively primes
the opposite direction arrow from that shown as a prime
(Lleras & Enns, 2004; Verleger et al., 2004). Our results can-
not address this controversy directly. However, a signiﬁ-
cant body of experimental research (Boy, Husain, Singh,
& Sumner, 2010; Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2006) has been
presented in favour of the auto-inhibition account. Our
core ﬁnding, that free decisions to inhibit can be uncon-
sciously biased, stands independently of precise details of
the mechanisms of NCE priming.
We found that PCE priming had no signiﬁcant effect on
free choice to act or inhibit. However, PCE priming did sig-
niﬁcantly modulate response times as expected, with Go
primes speeding and No-Go primes slowing responses.
That is, NCE priming inﬂuenced response choices, whilePCE priming inﬂuenced response latencies. This interesting
pattern of association was not predicted, and requires fur-
ther research. Very speculatively, action choices may in-
volve management of noise levels within action decision
systems, and therefore be subject to NCEs. In contrast, PCEs
may reﬂect excitability of post-decisional motor execution
pathways, for example as measured by lateralised readi-
ness potentials (Eimer & Schlaghecken, 1998). In previous
research (Schlaghecken & Eimer, 2004), free choices of
which of two action alternatives to perform were sensitive
to both PCE and NCE priming effects. Our current results
suggest that, when free choice concerns not which action
to select, but instead concerns the later decision of
whether to execute or inhibit the prepared action at the
last moment (Brass & Haggard, 2008), facilitatory PCE
priming effects are weaker than inhibitory NCE priming ef-
fects. This may reﬂect the importance of late-stage inhibi-
tion for free choices to act or not act.
Finally, Experiment 3, used up and down instead of left
and right arrows as primes and targets, and compared PCE
and NCE latencies in the same participants. Since the stim-
ulus and response dimensions in Experiment 3 were
orthogonal, these results exclude any spatial-compatibility
explanations that could potentially be applied to Experi-
ments 1 and 2 (i.e., compatibility between response hand
and arrow direction producing a ‘‘Simon Effect’’, Simon,
1969). In Experiment 3 we again demonstrated uncon-
scious priming effects on intentional inhibition, this time
when automatic spatial stimulus–response mappings are
eliminated. Moreover, comparisons between experiments
showed that stimulus orientation did not signiﬁcantly
inﬂuence the size of priming effects Thus, priming of inten-
tional inhibition is not simply a reﬂection of ‘Simon inhibi-
tion’ and spatial incompatibility costs. Experiment 3 also
replicated using a within-subjects design, the different ef-
fects of PCE and NCE priming on response times and free
choices to act or inhibit.
These results suggest that relatively late, volitional,
high-level cognitive control processes can be manipulated
by non-conscious means, contrary to previous supposition
(Dehaene et al., 2003). Previous studies showed how non-
conscious factors can inﬂuence volitional decisions, and
indeed entire behavioural patterns. For example, ‘‘social
priming’’ effects suggest that behaviour can be uncon-
sciously cued by social stereotypes (Bargh, Chen, &
Burrows, 1996). However, Doyen, Klein, Pichon, and
Cleeremans (2012) could not replicate this result. Further,
our paradigm has some experimental advantages over
‘‘social priming’’ methods: First, we explicitly demon-
strated the subliminal nature of the priming stimuli.
Second, we demonstrated bipolar directionality of the
priming effects (that is, we show facilitatory and inhibitory
primes in both PCE and NCE cases). Finally, we have been
able to use a within-subjects design, which is not generally
possible in social priming settings.
Low-level inﬂuences on high-level cognition have been
widely studied. For example, voluntary task-choice can be
affected by bottom-up inﬂuences such as task-difﬁculty or
repetition of task-set (Lien & Ruthruff, 2008; Poljac &
Yeung, 2012; Yeung, 2010). However, these studies appear
to involve an earlier processing stage than intentional inhi-
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of our study arises from the combination of bottom-up
inﬂuence, and the traditional association between con-
sciousness, self-control, and the ﬁnal inhibitory ‘‘veto’’ over
one’s own actions. Inﬂuential theories distinguish fully-
conscious late-stage processes from early non-conscious
representation (Dehaene et al., 2003). In contrast, our re-
sult suggests that the late-stage processes of action inhibi-
tion may also be subject to unconscious environmental
inﬂuences.
Our experiment unconsciously manipulated a late-
stage control process hile the individual remained unaware
of the manipulation. Our participants’ decisions to act or
inhibit were presumably conscious, though we did not
explicitly test for this, and indeed there is no established
method for doing so. However, we can be conﬁdent that
their (conscious) decisions depended on unconscious inﬂu-
ences from the external environment.
Our results suggest, then, that inhibition of voluntary
action is not only high-level and deliberate. Previous cog-
nitive models viewed decisions to inhibit as interruption of
routine schematised behaviour in novel situations, for
example in the supervisory attentional system (Norman
& Shallice, 1986; Shallice & Burgess, 1996). In the current
paradigm, our subliminal prime manipulations may just
bias ongoing ﬂuctuating activation levels of different ac-
tion alternatives (Leuthold & Kopp, 1998), and act as an
additional driver of internal noise in action decision cir-
cuits. Such effects could therefore potentially be explained
by a diffusion model (Schurger, Pereira, Treisman, & Cohen,
2009), combined with competitive inhibition between
alternatives. Our results do not exclude hierarchical cogni-
tive control of decisions to inhibit, but show that low-level
inﬂuences also contribute.
We observed priming of free decisions to inhibit in the
very constrained setting of a laboratory experimental par-
adigm. Subliminal priming effects are known to be para-
digm-speciﬁc, and do not generalise to everyday
behavioural control. Therefore, it remains unclear if the
mechanisms we have demonstrated are important in the
real world. However, our results have potentially interest-
ing implications for self-control. The capacity to inhibit the
impulse to act is of extreme legal importance. Our ﬁndings
suggest that this capacity can be unconsciously inﬂuenced
by external factors, at least under the restricted circum-
stances of our experiments. Since individuals are not aware
of these factors, perhaps they cannot reasonably control
them, and thus cannot be responsible for their own failures
to inhibit? Our study also has a more positive implication:
inhibitory capacity can be increased by unconscious inﬂu-
ences. This raises the interesting possibility of training self-
control using the techniques of implicit learning.
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